by Enéas Xavier
Ph.D. Candidate in International Law at Université de Montréal,
Coordinator for International Agreements Monitoring at the Climate Commission of the São Paulo Bar Association (OAB/SP),
Researcher at the Aimara Institute for Environmental Advocacy and Education, the International Courts Study Center at the University of São Paulo Law School (NETI-USP), and the Human and Environmental Rights Clinic at the State University of Amazonas.
Session under the Joint Leadership of the COP 29 and COP 30 Presidencies – SB 62, Bonn, June 18, 2025
The open consultation on the Baku–Belém Roadmap for the goal of mobilizing USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035, held during the 62nd session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies, marked a pivotal moment in the continued implementation of the decision adopted at COP 29 in Baku. The session, structured as an informal consultation with Parties, was jointly led by the presidencies of COP 29 (Azerbaijan) and COP 30 (Brazil), with active participation from the UNFCCC Secretariat and numerous country delegations and stakeholder groups.
OPENING STATEMENTS
Elmaddin Mehdiuyev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, opened the session and introduced the members of the panel.
COP 29 President Mukhtar Babayev began his statement by highlighting the symbolic importance of the consultation and thanking the COP 30 presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat for their partnership. He recalled the trajectory of climate finance since the early days of the Convention, stressing the importance of supporting developing countries as a way to raise climate ambition. He noted that although billions had already been mobilized, the urgency of the challenge demanded a new leap – which led, at COP 29, to the adoption of the objective of mobilizing at least USD 300 billion annually by 2030 and USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035.
Babayev described the Baku decision as a historic milestone that “turned billions into trillions,” creating predictability for long-term planning, strengthening trust, and sending a strong signal to the financial market. He reiterated that the Baku–Belém Roadmap is not a negotiated document but must be useful, concrete, credible, and actionable. However, he regretted the low participation of multilateral development banks, highlighting that only two had submitted contributions. He called on the shareholders of those banks to ensure alignment with the commitments made in Dubai.
The COP 29 President also emphasized that concessional and grant-based public finance is the cornerstone of the new goal. He stated that donor countries must now deliver on their promises, particularly the adaptation finance commitment agreed in Glasgow and contributions to the UNFCCC climate funds. He requested that countries detail how they intend to contribute to the USD 300 billion target by 2030 in their biennial communications under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, due by the end of 2026. He concluded by stating that this new era of climate finance must be marked by concrete action, not just words.
Next, COP 30 President-designate, Ambassador André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, endorsed Babayev’s points and stressed that the main goal of the consultation was to hear from participants. He recalled that Brazil is working to strengthen discussions under the Convention and the Paris Agreement while also broadening them to involve all sectors of society and government. He noted that, under the Brazilian presidency, a “Circle of Finance Ministers” was created to integrate climate into the real economy and fiscal policy.
He highlighted that Finance Minister Fernando Haddad had prioritized this agenda since the beginning of the current administration, including within the G20. The Circle is already engaging with key actors, including multilateral development banks. Corrêa do Lago also announced the creation of an Ad Hoc Advisory Council on Economy, Finance and Climate to provide technical and academic support to the COP 30 presidency. He concluded by reiterating Brazil’s intention to present, by October, a robust and meaningful roadmap built on the ideas and proposals received.
Finally, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell welcomed participants and praised the leadership of the COP presidencies in guiding the process. He highlighted that the 114 submissions received so far reflect a strong consensus on the urgency of climate action and the need to reach the USD 1.3 trillion annual goal by 2035. He emphasized that climate finance is not charity but an investment in global stability and the foundation of trust in the climate regime. To that end, he called for a practical, credible roadmap centered on high-impact solutions, including: scaling up grant-based public finance, simplifying access to existing funds, mobilizing private capital, and overcoming systemic barriers such as the high cost of capital and institutional fragmentation.
Stiell warned that the calls to triple disbursements from climate funds by 2030 must not be ignored and that it is essential to build on the political momentum created in Baku, even amid current geopolitical challenges. He concluded by saying that this is an opportunity to transform agreed ambition into concrete action, guided by cooperation and with real impact on the ground.
The co-moderator Luiz de Andrade Filho, representing Brazil, took the floor to present the organization of the consultation event led by the CMA 6 and CMA 7 presidencies on the Baku–Belém Roadmap to mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion annually in climate finance by 2035.
He began by greeting the Parties and underscoring the importance of broad participation, especially given the busy conference agenda. He then briefly recalled the mandate conferred by CMA 6, which urged actors to work together to scale up climate finance for developing countries from all sources—public and private—with a view to reaching at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. In this context, it was decided to launch the Baku–Belém Roadmap under the guidance of the presidencies and in consultation with relevant bodies.
The roadmap is expected to enable increased climate finance to developing countries, fostering climate-resilient and low-emission development pathways, as well as the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The financing should include grants, concessional instruments, non-debt-generating mechanisms, and measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives where appropriate. At the end of the process, the presidencies will prepare a report summarizing the work, to be submitted to CMA 7.
The co-moderator noted that the process began on February 21, 2025, with the issuance of a formal notification inviting Parties and other stakeholders to submit written inputs based on guiding questions. According to him, the responses received demonstrated strong engagement and commitment to the process. On March 4, virtual consultations were held with Party groups to discuss general expectations and potential approaches. On May 13, the work plan was published, outlining the proposed methodology, the organization of the process, and the planned consultation events — including the in-person meeting held on that day.
As of the time of the meeting, 116 written contributions had been received, including 20 from Parties or Party groups and 96 from a wide range of non-state actors, including NGOs, research institutions, intergovernmental organizations, financial and business entities, cities, and universities. Luiz de Andrade emphasized the enthusiasm surrounding the diversity of actors involved, which reflects a strong collective interest and a willingness to work together to scale up financial flows to developing countries.
Given the richness of the submissions, the co-moderator indicated that it would not be possible to summarize them adequately at that time but noted that three key messages emerged as cross-cutting themes:
2. The engagement of a wide range of actors at all levels and territories throughout the implementation process.
3. The importance of country ownership, ensuring that scaled-up climate finance supports the NDCs and NAPs of developing countries.
The contributions gathered a broad set of case studies, good practices, and innovative proposals, including:
· Financial instruments that address the high cost of capital;
· Structures recognizing the differentiated roles of various actors in the financial ecosystem;
· Cooperative efforts integrating interdisciplinary knowledge to achieve scale;
· Enabling actions that strengthen both supply and demand for climate finance;
· Identification of existing multilateral initiatives that could serve as foundations or be leveraged by the roadmap.
IRAQ, ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP OF 77 + CHINA
Iraq, speaking on behalf of the G77 + China, thanked the presidencies of CMA6 and CMA7 for organizing the open consultation on the Baku–Belém Roadmap to achieve the USD 1.3 trillion target. The delegation reaffirmed that the process must remain under the full and exclusive leadership of the presidencies, with the due incorporation of inputs from all Parties and other stakeholders, in accordance with the mandates established by previous decisions. It highlighted four key expectations from the group regarding the roadmap.
First, it emphasized the need for the process to be transparent, inclusive, and interactive, ensuring broad consultation with the Parties to the Convention and the Paris Agreement. It stressed that, as this is the operationalization of the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) adopted in Dubai, it is essential to guarantee the involvement of all G77 + China groupings before any preliminary version of the roadmap is released. It reiterated that the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities must be at the heart of the process, so that developed countries fulfill their climate finance obligations, as established in Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The intermediate goal of USD 300 billion by 2030, according to the group, must be considered the minimum starting point for the development of the roadmap, which must also clarify the additional roles of developed countries in this context.
Second, the group highlighted the importance of ensuring that the roadmap responds to the constantly evolving needs and priorities of developing countries. The decision adopted at COP 29, although considered a step forward, needs to be strengthened through the roadmap, which must establish viable pathways to financially support climate implementation efforts and just transitions, across all sectors and thematic areas. It reiterated that the process must respect national sovereignty and the bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement, and avoid any attempt to shift the financial obligations of developed countries onto developing ones.
As a third point, the group argued that the roadmap must be based on Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the relevant provisions of the Convention, supporting national strategies led by developing countries, including those relating to adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and other climate strategies based on national priorities.
Finally, the G77 + China stated that the roadmap must address concrete challenges related to climate finance, such as the high cost of capital, elevated transaction costs to access resources, and unilateral measures, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It proposed that the roadmap identify practical approaches and areas of work to tackle these obstacles, organizing the content around thematic areas such as: the definition of climate finance; finance-generating actions; adaptation finance; responses to loss and damage; just transitions; and low-emission, climate-resilient development. The group proposed that the roadmap be inspired by national priorities for poverty eradication and sustainable development, and that it serve as a broad platform addressing all the needs of developing countries. To achieve this, it advocated for the establishment of a clear agreement on burden-sharing among developed countries, with the definition of specific financial contributions that ensure predictability and transparency. The roadmap must also provide additional and operational channels for accessing climate finance, that are efficient, coordinated, and considerate of the specific needs of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
SAMOA, ON BEHALF OF AOSIS
AOSIS began its intervention by emphasizing that the USD 1.3 trillion target by 2035 will only be meaningful if tied to concrete solutions to the challenges of volume and accessibility of climate finance. It stressed that the roadmap must reflect the unique vulnerabilities and specificities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS). In response to the question on the substantive issues that the roadmap should address, the group stated that climate finance must be treated as the defining issue of its implementation. In that sense, it stressed the importance of ensuring that climate finance be public, non-repayable, predictable, and accessible.
AOSIS recalled the importance of operationalizing paragraph 9.9 of the Paris Agreement, as well as decision 12/CMA.5, which recognizes the need to remove barriers faced by developing countries—particularly SIDS—in accessing climate finance. The delegation highlighted that these barriers remain, especially with regard to direct access procedures and eligibility, which require urgent action.
AOSIS also advocated for greater attention to adaptation and resilience, with the use of innovative, non-debt-generating instruments, such as debt-for-climate swaps, channeling of Special Drawing Rights, and concrete fiscal measures—such as debt restructuring and tailored mechanisms for SIDS.
Regarding short- and medium-term actions, AOSIS identified as essential steps the publication of a detailed and transparent roadmap, the establishment of clear targets, and the strengthening of existing funds, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund. It also stressed the importance of the private sector in supporting the development of enabling ecosystems for attracting climate-compatible investments aligned with national commitments. The delegation called on the presidencies and developed Parties to support planning, mobilization, and fulfillment of financial pledges based on grants, as well as to promote reforms in access to finance. It stressed that international financial institutions must be equipped to provide effective mechanisms, including innovative instruments and tools adapted to the scale and realities of climate projects in SIDS.
In conclusion, AOSIS reaffirmed that the roadmap must not be merely a technical or political exercise, but rather a concrete instrument that delivers real, accessible, and accountable finance for Small Island Developing States. It reiterated its commitment to the presidencies and to joint technical work to ensure that the USD 1.3 trillion target effectively works for all.
SWITZERLAND, ON BEHALF OF THE EIG
EIG began its intervention by thanking the presidencies for their opening remarks and for leading the process, emphasizing that the work plan presented for the Baku–Belém Roadmap, which is scheduled to begin on September 1st, represents a significant step forward. The delegation stated that it recognizes the role of the presidencies as pen holders and understands that the roadmap will not result in a formally negotiated product, but rather in a process of construction based on contributions, reflections, and inputs from all Parties and relevant stakeholders.
In this regard, it raised the question of how the presidencies intend to structure the reception and use of contributions throughout the process, and how they plan to ensure the inclusion and representativeness of all perspectives—especially considering that not all countries are fully engaged in the preparatory process for the USD 1.3 trillion goal.
EIG indicated that the roadmap could be organized around five action areas, and that predictability will be a central element for the success of the process. It emphasized that it is essential to take into account the contributions of all Parties at each stage, and that the roadmap must contain practical elements to facilitate the implementation of the New Collective Quantified Goal, based on efficiently mobilized public finance.
It further highlighted the importance of identifying the most effective instruments to scale up support to developing countries, including the strategic use of public guarantees and already tested financial mechanisms. EIG expressed support for including concrete examples of successful operations, such as guarantee commissions and platforms involving the private sector, as a way to expand fiscal space and address challenges like the insurance coverage gap for climate risks.
The delegation also suggested that the roadmap include financial inclusion aspects, proposing instruments aimed at migrant and refugee populations, as well as technologies to broaden access to climate finance. It advocated for the creation of coordination platforms among the various involved actors and stressed that the roadmap should incorporate elements aimed at creating enabling environments, strengthening regulatory and institutional frameworks, and increasing access to stable resources capable of promoting economic transformation through large-scale public and private investments.
Finally, EIG expressed interest in having the roadmap build on previous experiences, such as the Sharm El-Sheikh Dialogue, in order to avoid repeating ineffective measures and to ensure that the process is constructive, efficient, and results-oriented.
AILAC
AILAC began its intervention by recalling that, in the previous year, Parties achieved a historic breakthrough by committing to mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 to support developing countries in climate action. According to the group, the Baku–Belém Roadmap must now provide the political and technical guidance necessary to achieve—and wherever possible, exceed—that goal.
AILAC emphasized that this amount must be understood as a floor, not a ceiling, and reiterated that the roadmap must reaffirm the commitment to long-term climate action and to the ambitious implementation of NDCs, adaptation, loss and damage responses, and just transitions.
The group proposed that the roadmap be organized around three essential pillars.
The first concerns the contribution of financial actors, especially developed countries, which must fully comply with their obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The group also highlighted the role of non-state actors, such as the private sector and multilateral development banks, provided that their mandates and differentiated responsibilities are respected. It stressed that financial flows must support national processes in developing countries, help alleviate debt burdens, and eliminate barriers to accessing resources—through simplified procedures, increased predictability, and the development of instruments such as blended finance and risk-sharing mechanisms.
The second pillar addresses the alignment between the roadmap and national climate planning instruments, such as NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and loss and damage response strategies. These instruments should be recognized as the legitimate basis for resource mobilization and supported with highly concessional financing, with particular attention to Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
The third pillar concerns the need for clarity about the nature of climate finance, which must be new, additional, and non-debt-generating. AILAC expressed concern over the lack of specificity in the commitments made in the COP 29 decision and argued that the roadmap must address these gaps. It stressed that the 1.5°C target will only be achieved with predictable and adequate financial support, requiring a results-oriented roadmap with clear monitoring and accountability mechanisms.
Finally, the group emphasized that the roadmap must incorporate a differentiated and fair approach, capable of reflecting the concrete needs of developing countries, ensuring scale, effectiveness, and equity, and establishing a robust system for tracking implementation, with special attention to the challenges faced by LDCs in accessing climate finance.
GAMBIA, ON BEHALF OF THE LDC GROUP
Gambia, on behalf of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) group, began its intervention by reaffirming that the decision adopted in Baku represents a formal step forward, but falls short of the ambition and expectations of developing countries—especially LDCs. The delegation emphasized that the approved text lacks clarity regarding the scale and effective commitment needed to enable predictable, accessible, and adequate climate finance, at the pace and magnitude required by the climate crisis.
For the LDCs, the Baku–Belém Roadmap must be both ambitious and feasible, providing the necessary guidelines to accelerate the implementation of climate commitments aligned with the 1.5°C limit. The group expressed concern that this limit is already on the verge of being breached, requiring a no-regret approach.
The group stressed that the roadmap must address the gaps left by the Baku decision, enabling the full and timely implementation of the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) and establishing a solid foundation for climate finance—which must be sufficient, predictable, and accessible. It further emphasized the importance of addressing key outstanding issues, such as the quality and adequacy of climate finance, which must be mainly grant-based and provided on highly concessional terms, with particular attention to adaptation efforts and loss and damage responses.
The LDCs also drew attention to the urgent need to improve access to finance, scale up adaptation flows, and establish clear mechanisms for loss and damage. They further stressed the importance of tackling the debt crisis in a systemic manner and ensuring that finance mechanisms expand fiscal space, rather than restrict it.
Gambia underlined the importance of formally recognizing the special needs and circumstances of LDCs in accessing climate finance. The group called for a coordinated, transparent, and inclusive approach, both within and outside the UNFCCC. It also requested the definition of roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the roadmap.
Regarding short-term actions, the LDCs argued that the roadmap must be robust and operationalize both the interim target of USD 300 billion by 2030 and the main target of USD 1.3 trillion by 2035. According to the group, the roadmap must fully address all elements of the NCQG decision, including support for loss and damage, and establish clear interim milestones aligned with NDCs and NAPs.
Additionally, the group called for the roadmap to specify concrete implications for the concessionality of climate finance through multilateral development banks, setting new targets for grant-based and highly favorable financing, especially for LDCs. They also supported proposals to reduce the cost of capital in developing countries and reiterated their proposal to triple adaptation finance by 2030—a goal mentioned in paragraph 16 of the Baku decision.
The LDCs also demanded reforms to direct access mechanisms, including simplifying processes and accelerating disbursement of funds. Finally, they emphasized the importance of scaling up public finance, including through innovative financial instruments, and establishing a robust monitoring and tracking mechanism to transparently assess progress in implementing the roadmap.
In conclusion, Gambia stated that the LDC group is fully committed to constructive participation in the next stages of the COP and expressed support for a truly inclusive process, as is already underway through the presidency-led consultation.
SAUDI ARABIA, ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB GROUP
Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, began its intervention by thanking the COP 29 and COP 30 presidencies for organizing the consultation and fully aligning itself with the statement by the G77 + China. The group emphasized that the Baku–Belém Roadmap represents a strategic opportunity to achieve balance and to amplify the voices of developing countries, both in terms of the content and method of mobilizing climate finance.
The delegation presented a critical analysis of current climate finance flows, highlighting severe geographic disparities. In 2022, according to the Climate Policy Initiative, flows reached USD 1.46 trillion, of which USD 496 billion were directed to Western Europe and North America, while only USD 150 billion combined reached South Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. For the group, this reflects the urgent need for geographic rebalancing.
The group also noted that over 90% of climate finance is allocated to mitigation, to the detriment of adaptation and loss and damage response, which are priorities for the Global South. It stressed that even with full mitigation, climate impacts will persist and disproportionately affect developing countries. Therefore, the roadmap must send a clear political signal about the need for thematic balance across the three areas.
Another point raised was the importance of supporting the development and transfer of low-emission technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). Despite increases in investment, amounts remain far below what is necessary, according to estimates by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF).
Saudi Arabia also argued that philanthropic foundations can help de-risk investments, but warned that the lack of traceability in financial flows limits their effectiveness. Improving transparency in this field could amplify the impact of philanthropic climate finance.
The intervention also warned of the risk of excessive indebtedness, noting that 53% of current climate finance corresponds to market-rate loans, while only USD 76 billion comes in the form of concessional loans. The group reiterated the need to change the current logic, prioritizing grants and highly concessional finance.
In addition, the group rejected any attempt to shift financial responsibility onto developing countries and affirmed that the commitments under Article 4.3 of the Convention and Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement must be fully implemented.
For short-term action, the group proposed measures such as:
• Standardized monitoring mechanisms;
• Integration of climate finance into national budgets;
• Creation of dedicated budget lines;
• And the conversion of commitments into legally binding instruments, such as executive contracts.
It also suggested additional sources of funding, such as taxes on international trade, revenues from large fashion companies (with a potential of USD 310 billion in three years), and green sovereign bond issuances, estimated at up to USD 70 billion per year.
Finally, it warned against unilateral climate trade mechanisms, such as CBAM, which harm developing economies, and called for these issues to be addressed with transparency, inclusion, and respect for multilateralism.
TANZANIA, ON BEHALF OF THE AFRICAN GROUP OF NEGOTIATORS (AGN)
Tanzania, on behalf of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), began its intervention by emphasizing that the decisions related to the USD 1.3 trillion roadmap reaffirm the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture and recognize that unsustainable debt levels directly impact the climate ambition of African countries. It was reported that, in 2024 alone, African countries paid USD 89.4 billion in external debt, and that in 2022, debt service amounted to 22.4% of the continent’s combined GDP—a burden that continues to severely limit their climate action capacity.
In light of this context, the AGN argued that the Baku–Belém Roadmap must enable the mobilization and provision of finance at levels that are compatible with the needs of African countries, acknowledging this as an ongoing structural barrier. According to the group, the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) stipulates the need to reduce the cost of capital—a necessary condition for enabling a just and financially viable transition across the African continent.
The group emphasized the need to strengthen financing for adaptation, noting that the roadmap must reflect the ambition agreed upon at COP 28 regarding the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). It also highlighted the remaining gaps in addressing climate-induced loss and damage, reiterating the urgency of enhanced action in this area, with appropriate technical and financial support.
The AGN stressed that the roadmap must be grounded in the legal obligations of developed countries, as set out in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and that the USD 1.3 trillion target must include clear burden-sharing mechanisms. Climate finance should be tied to the outcomes desired by the international community: the transition toward a climate-resilient and sustainable world. To achieve this, it is essential to address the existing gaps in how the needs and priorities of developing countries are identified, articulated, and linked to the allocation of financial resources.
In this context, the intervention highlighted two priority examples for the African continent: the Mission 300 (focused on energy access) and the clean cooking agenda, both considered central to a just transition in Africa. According to the group, the roadmap must be dynamic and reflect scientific developments, the climate ambition cycle, and the evolving needs of developing countries, particularly in light of the five-year NDC cycles and the Global Stocktake reviews through 2030.
The African Group emphasized that the roadmap must address the quality of climate finance, which should be guided by criteria such as debt sustainability, loan costs, and the significant participation of public sources. Furthermore, it should include a clear description of appropriate financial instruments, as well as the role of international public finance in mobilizing private sector resources.
The AGN reiterated that the roadmap must not displace the legal obligations of developed countries under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and that Articles 9.3 and 9.4 must not be used to dilute those obligations. It emphasized that the NCQG is not an investment objective, but a public finance provision goal, and there must be clarity on how the USD 1.3 trillion value will be operationalized, with timelines and concrete links to national needs—especially regarding the implementation of NDCs 1 and 2 in African countries.
In relation to the thematic topics of the roadmap, the AGN suggested including:
• Instruments used to deliver funds to developing countries;
• Clear timelines enabling accountability mechanisms;
• Enabling environments in developed countries, including policies, mandates, and appropriate delivery channels for climate finance in the context of NDCs;
• Barriers to financial flows, which must be properly mapped and addressed;
• Informed guidance for the Article 2.1(c) Dialogue (Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue) and its complementarity with Article 9.
The group concluded by stressing that the roadmap must respect the institutional governance mandates of existing funds and be built through a transparent and inclusive process, upholding the principles of multilateralism and climate equity.
INDIA, ON BEHALF OF THE LDC GROUP
India, speaking on behalf of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) group, began its intervention by thanking the presidencies of COP 29 and COP 30 for convening the consultation and expressed alignment with the previous statements delivered by G77 + China and the Arab Group. The group reiterated that the Baku–Belém Roadmap is a joint initiative of the presidencies and does not constitute a negotiated outcome.
Although it was understood that the COP 30 presidency created the “Circle of Finance Ministers” to oversee the work of a group of experts tasked with developing a report for the Circle, and that consultations are being held with private sector stakeholders, the LDCs voiced concern about the lack of clarity in the roadmap’s development process.
The LDCs emphasized the need to clarify the relationship between the work of the Circle of Finance Ministers, the expert group’s report, and the substantive content of the roadmap itself. They pointed out that while some LDC members are represented in the Circle, others are not, and this also applies to other negotiating groups. It was noted that the Circle’s consultations are disproportionately focused on actors based in developed countries, especially those involved in forums such as the London and New York Climate Weeks—spaces that do not necessarily represent the key stakeholders engaged in climate finance in developing countries.
The group questioned why such discussions are being held in parallel events outside the UNFCCC process, where representation and focus on developing countries would be more appropriate. Additionally, it was highlighted that the structure and format of the roadmap remain unknown, creating uncertainty around planned actions, responsible actors, timelines, and implementation modalities. For these reasons, the LDCs advocated that the roadmap drafting process be carried out with transparency, clarity, and inclusiveness.
On substance, the LDCs stressed that the roadmap must adopt a developing country–centered approach, as the scale-up to USD 1.3 trillion annually, as established in the Baku decision, is intended to benefit these countries. In that context, they insisted that Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement serve as the central pillar of the roadmap, and that it be concretely explored how this article will be operationalized and implemented.
They reaffirmed that access to public finance from developed countries is essential to catalyze the mobilization of additional resources, including from the private sector—but that this will only be possible through the provision of grants, not debt-based instruments.
The group emphasized that debating Article 9.1 in the context of the roadmap is crucial to reaching the scale of USD 1.3 trillion annually. Regarding the role of various actors, the LDCs acknowledged that consultations with the private sector are useful to understand its expectations regarding climate projects, but argued that it is equally important to consider the needs, limitations, and specific circumstances of developing countries, so that the roadmap realistically addresses barriers to finance access, instead of shifting the financial burden onto these countries.
According to the LDCs, large-scale climate finance at reasonable cost will only be achievable with public support from developed countries. They reiterated that it is widely known that the private sector operates at market-based costs, making it unfeasible for many developing countries to implement innovative technologies and scale up their climate actions. In this regard, they stressed that the principle of responsibilities enshrined in the climate regime requires a robust role for public action from developed countries.
Therefore, the LDCs argued that the roadmap must fully incorporate:
1. The legal obligations contained in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, based on their foundational principles;
2. Safeguards against the undue transfer of financial responsibilities to developing countries;
3. Recognition of the needs and priorities of developing countries, with mechanisms that ensure flexibility in implementation.
Regarding the process, the LDCs called for greater transparency, clarity, and inclusion, including through regional consultations and expanded discussion spaces within the UNFCCC. They also requested that the presidencies convene additional meetings on this matter before the Pre-COP, in order to broaden engagement and ensure that the concerns of the Least Developed Countries are fully reflected in the Baku–Belém Roadmap.
NORWAY, ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union began its intervention by thanking the presidencies for the opportunity to contribute its observations, noting that, like other Parties, it had already submitted a written contribution. The representative mentioned that, to some extent, the discussions still seemed to retain the technical tone of the NCQG Expert Dialogues, but expressed relief that the current meeting was not a renegotiation of the NCQG, which was considered a positive development for all.
From the outset, the EU sought to provide context for its approach. It reaffirmed that it provides and will continue to provide climate finance, and expressed its commitment to implementing the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) adopted in Baku. It also expressed readiness to continue discussions on the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, including specifically Article 9.1, which establishes the obligation of developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries.
Regarding its submission’s priorities, the EU highlighted that implementing the NCQG requires the engagement of all actors and valued the Baku–Belém Roadmap process as an opportunity to ensure broad participation. It showed particular interest in hearing the views of non-state actors in the roadmap consultations—especially project developers and international financial agents—and indicated its intention to participate actively in these discussions.
The EU argued that the roadmap should define clear pathways, both nationally and globally, to scale up financial flows directed to climate action in developing countries. To this end, it emphasized the need to leverage private finance and catalyze investments in mitigation and adaptation, including those linked to the implementation of NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).
In this context, the European Union suggested that the roadmap could adopt language more aligned with the financial sector, such as “portfolio investments” and “debt and equity instruments”, rather than the traditional distinction of “mobilized public or private finance”. To achieve this shift in approach, it recommended that the development of the roadmap function as a dialogue platform with external stakeholders, especially companies and institutional investors, enabling identification, communication, and engagement with these actors. It also recommended that the roadmap promote reforms and innovative solutions, creating synergies between the UNFCCC and external actors.
The EU characterized the roadmap as a vehicle to connect concrete actions with capable actors, unlocking investments toward the USD 1.3 trillion goal. It emphasized that this effort should build upon existing processes and initiatives, such as:
· The 4th International Conference on Financing for Development,
· The G20 working group on global climate finance mobilization,
· The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ),
· The Bridgetown Initiative,
· The People and Planet for Prosperity Pact,
· And the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action.
Expressing interest in the Circle of Finance Ministers established by the COP 30 presidency, the EU encouraged the Circle to draw from the lessons and progress already made by the aforementioned coalition.
In addressing the structural elements of the roadmap, the EU reiterated that mobilizing large-scale investments requires the creation of enabling environments and favorable conditions, especially in developing countries. It emphasized the importance of removing barriers to access and attracting investors, through reforms that generate confidence and security for capital flows.
The EU reaffirmed its commitment to working with all Parties and stakeholders to increase climate finance for developing countries and encouraged all who are in a position to contribute to do so, with special attention to countries in vulnerable situations, such as LDCs and SIDS.
Finally, the EU argued that the roadmap should foster a more effective integration of climate finance and development finance, noting that this is a unique opportunity to align these financial flows, given the diversity of actors involved.
Concluding its intervention, the European Union emphasized that it sees the roadmap as a time-bound (one-year) effort, not negotiated, and expressed optimism regarding the outcomes that will be presented at COP 30.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates began its intervention by thanking the COP presidency for convening the consultation on the Baku–Belém Roadmap, highlighting the critical importance of this process for the development of an ambitious and feasible climate finance report to be presented at COP 30 in Belém.
The representative recalled that the adoption of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) at COP 29 was a historic achievement, and that the Baku–Belém Roadmap will be essential to operationalize that decision.
Despite the fact that global climate finance flows have already reached approximately USD 1.3 trillion per year, only 15% of that amount currently reaches developing countries. To meet their needs, those flows must be multiplied by seven by 2035.
In this context, the United Arab Emirates highlighted three main priorities:
1. Leadership from developed countries in mobilizing at least USD 300 billion annually in public finance by 2035, with an emphasis on grants and concessional instruments;
2. Urgent reform of the multilateral financial architecture, which is currently marked by high costs, inefficiencies, and fragmentation—factors that limit access to resources by those who need them most. It advocated that multilateral development banks and international financial institutions modernize, adopt non-debt-generating instruments, simplify access procedures, and align their resources with national climate priorities;
3. The roadmap must mobilize both public and private finance, reduce the cost of capital, relieve debt burdens, expand the use of concessional and blended instruments, and accelerate structural reforms to enable climate finance at scale.
The United Arab Emirates emphasized that, during its COP 29 presidency, it defended the view that climate finance should be adequate in scale, accessible, feasible, and capable of mobilizing private capital without exacerbating the debt burden of developing countries.
It concluded by reaffirming its commitment to building a climate finance system that is fair, effective, and inclusive, and expressed its readiness to work with all Parties to ensure that climate finance becomes more available, more equitable, more effective, and truly accessible to all.
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom opened its statement by stressing that it sees the Baku–Belém Roadmap as a historic opportunity, with the potential to redefine the role of climate finance within the global financial architecture. For the UK delegation, this process represents a concrete chance to rethink the place and function of grant-based and concessional finance in the broader climate finance ecosystem.
The United Kingdom reiterated its commitment to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, stating that this commitment is directly linked to its support for a truly ambitious and comprehensive roadmap, built upon concrete proposals and clear steps forward. The delegation presented three key elements that it considers essential to the construction of the roadmap:
1. Scalable solutions: The UK advocated for a focus on initiatives with proven scalability and replicability, such as the use of financial guarantees and innovative instruments. It emphasized that the efficient use of public and concessional finance requires strengthening the leveraging role of multilateral development banks (MDBs), citing the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as a positive example.
2. Catalytic changes: Structural proposals were highlighted, including the role and coverage of pre-established financing mechanisms, the importance of debt sustainability, and the promotion of country platforms for planning and executing climate action. While these may not constitute direct sources of funding, such measures are essential to create the fiscal space necessary for developing countries to act in a world increasingly affected by climate impacts. In this regard, the UK expressed its expectation for the adoption of a decision in October on climate-related finance linked to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
3. Strategic shifts: The UK delegation advocated for the use of the roadmap as a tool to promote structural transformations, such as:
o Ensuring that all development finance contributes to climate resilience;
o The systematic integration of climate risk into private sector decision-making;
o Recognizing natural capital and sectoral approaches as legitimate and integral components of the climate finance architecture.
The United Kingdom acknowledged that different actors are needed for different tasks, and reiterated that adaptation finance will remain a priority. It even noted that private sector contributions to adaptation already exceed what is recognized through the formal UNFCCC processes. The delegation emphasized that some actions can be implemented immediately, while others will require ongoing reforms—both of which are necessary and urgent.
The intervention concluded with a clear emphasis on the importance of an inclusive process, one that ensures broad participation from all Parties and relevant stakeholders, in order to build long-term support and drive concrete action toward the goals of the Paris Agreement. According to the United Kingdom, this will be the true measure of success for the roadmap—a success to which the UK is strongly committed.
COSTA RICA
Costa Rica began its intervention by reiterating full alignment with the statements of the G77 + China and AILAC. For the Costa Rican delegation, the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) is not merely a target—it is a promise of transformation. However, a promise without a clear pathway is merely an aspiration. Therefore, the Baku–Belém Roadmap must become the backbone of implementing this commitment.
The fundamental question that must guide this process, according to Costa Rica, is:
How will we mobilize USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 in real, accessible, and fair climate finance for developing countries?
To that end, Costa Rica outlined four essential pillars:
The current climate finance architecture is inadequate, unequal, and overly debt-based. In 2024, Costa Rica’s public debt reached around 60% of GDP, reflecting the situation of many developing countries. In this context, climate finance that increases indebtedness is neither sustainable nor just.
The roadmap must therefore prioritize scaling up grants, highly concessional instruments, and flows that do not generate debt, while expanding countries’ fiscal space. It must also include interim milestones, regular review mechanisms, and strong accountability measures, focusing on equity, predictability, and effective responses in mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.
Reaching USD 1.3 trillion per year is not merely about volume—it requires a systemic restructuring. The roadmap must accelerate structural changes in the international financial system, including:
· Alignment of public budgets and fiscal frameworks with climate ambition;
· Use of fiscal tools based on the polluter-pays principle;
· Shifting financial responsibility to the private sector, particularly high-emitting sectors;
· Implementation of innovative mechanisms, such as guarantees, insurance, green and blue bonds, and results-based payments (especially for adaptation and biodiversity conservation);
· Inclusion of nature as an asset in the balance sheets of developing countries.
According to Costa Rica, these are not radical ideas—they are the bare minimum required to correct deeply entrenched asymmetries.
The roadmap must clearly define who does what, when, and how. Developed countries must lead with public finance. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) must commit to structural reforms, simplify access, and offer concessional terms, with particular attention to vulnerable middle-income countries, which are often overlooked.
The private sector must move from the periphery to the center, acting in alignment with 1.5°C pathways, nature-positive outcomes, and social equity, with a focus on human rights, gender equality, youth, and Indigenous peoples.
Costa Rica also advocated for national ownership of climate processes, with local access and empowerment of subnational levels. Climate action does not happen in meeting rooms—it happens in the territory.
To reach the USD 1.3 trillion target, it is not enough to scale up existing financial flows. What is needed is a decisive shift in the logic of resource allocation. This includes:
· Eliminating environmentally harmful subsidies;
· Aligning all public and private investments with the 1.5°C goal;
· Reforming the rules that govern capital, so that it flows to where climate action is actually taking place.
Costa Rica concluded its intervention by stating that the roadmap is a test of the credibility of the multilateral climate regime. If it merely repeats past promises, it will fail. But if it dares to answer the hard questions—who pays, how resources flow, and how developing countries can actually access the finance they need—then it could become a pillar of climate justice.
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand thanked the Presidencies for the opportunity to speak on the Baku–Belém Roadmap. It stressed that this is not the time to revisit financial target negotiations like the NCQG, but rather a moment to focus on the concrete instruments needed to enable its implementation. According to the delegation, the roadmap represents a unique opportunity to catalyze investment in climate action in developing countries, as highlighted by the G77’s emphasis on the centrality of nationally determined strategies.
New Zealand stated that there is a real opportunity to promote a distinct and effective approach, echoing Costa Rica’s call for transformation. In order for the roadmap to reach its potential, the delegation outlined four fundamental conditions:
First, the roadmap must be anchored in practical realities and engage with the broad range of actors—both state and non-state—that shape investment flows, such as financial institutions, companies, regulators, and economic stakeholders. For this to happen, the roadmap must be relevant to these actors, and its development must involve broad consultation, be informed by the best available information, and reflect market realities.
Second, the roadmap must explicitly identify specific instruments to scale up climate adaptation finance in developing countries, in addition to mitigation. It will be essential to identify gaps and propose solutions that make finance more scalable, accessible, and suited to the needs of all developing countries, including SIDS and LDCs. New Zealand reaffirmed its commitment to promoting recipient-led approaches and flexible programmatic support, aimed at increasing efficiency and impact. It also emphasized that the private sector can play a significant role, through insurance, climate risk integration, and smart investments.
As a third point, the delegation stressed the importance of strengthening enabling environments. The roadmap should offer concrete recommendations on the factors that drive or hinder investment—such as domestic resource mobilization, information transparency, ease of doing business, regulatory frameworks, and the adoption of best practices. New Zealand emphasized that short- and medium-term structural reforms in regulatory environments can have positive, cumulative long-term effects, helping scale up investments in developing countries.
Finally, New Zealand reiterated the need for the roadmap development process to be inclusive and transparent. It supported the LDCs’ call for more clarity on the interaction between the Circle of Finance Ministers, the expert group, Party contributions, and the final product. An open and participatory process is seen as essential to ensure that the roadmap reflects diverse concerns, enjoys political legitimacy, and is capable of driving real and shared progress.
COLOMBIA
Colombia began its statement by aligning itself with the interventions of G77 + China and AILAC, and by thanking the COP 29 and COP 30 presidencies for their leadership in the climate finance agenda. The delegation described the Baku–Belém Roadmap as a crucial opportunity to advance systemic transformation in how finance is mobilized, allocated, and accessed by developing countries.
For Colombia, USD 1.3 trillion per year should not be viewed as a ceiling, but rather as the minimum threshold required to align financial flows with 1.5°C pathways, resilience building, and the protection of biodiversity and people. The country expressed concern that climate finance flows remain largely misaligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, noting that just 2% of tracked global financial flows are consistent with these objectives.
Colombia stressed the need to shift from fragmented and project-based approaches to systemic, strategic financing that supports countries in implementing transformational national climate plans. The delegation called for the roadmap to include specific reforms to the multilateral financial system, especially multilateral development banks (MDBs), to:
· Increase the concessionality of finance,
· Ensure debt sustainability,
· Improve the speed and efficiency of disbursement,
· And broaden access to climate finance.
The delegation highlighted the importance of designing financial instruments that respond to the actual needs and realities of developing countries, especially middle-income nations that face high climate vulnerability but limited access to concessional finance. Colombia called for greater recognition of the unique situation of vulnerable middle-income countries, which often fall into support gaps.
Colombia emphasized that climate finance must also be gender-responsive, inclusive, and equity-driven. The delegation stressed the importance of ensuring that finance reaches local communities, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant populations, youth, and territories on the frontlines of climate change. In this regard, the roadmap must propose mechanisms to increase direct access to finance and strengthen subnational implementation.
Finally, Colombia reiterated that the roadmap must be non-negotiated, transparent, and open to the meaningful participation of all Parties and stakeholders. It should provide a space to co-create actionable pathways for reform and mobilization—building on inputs not only from governments, but also from civil society, academia, and the private sector. The country expressed its full support for a roadmap that is ambitious, inclusive, and transformative.
Next Steps
The session was concluded with expressions of gratitude from the chair, who highlighted the richness and usefulness of the interventions made. The presidency informed that, unfortunately, it would be necessary to end the session precisely at that moment, but assured that it would be rescheduled to allow the remaining speakers to take the floor — South Africa, Australia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Egypt, Marshall Islands, Japan, Nepal, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Turkey, Vanuatu, Armenia, and Kazakhstan.
As a reminder, it was announced that the following morning at 10 a.m., a session dedicated to non-state actors would take place, to which all Parties are cordially invited. The Presidents of COP 29 and COP 30 will be in attendance, as well as Brazil’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Economy, who will speak about the Circle of Finance Ministers initiative.
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